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The social or joint Simon effect has been developed to investigate how and to what
extent people mentally represent their own and other persons’ action/task and how these
cognitive representations influence an individual’s own behavior when interacting with
another person. Here, we provide a review of the available evidence and theoretical
frameworks. Based on this review, we suggest a comprehensive theory that integrates
aspects of earlier approaches–the Referential Coding Account. This account provides an
alternative to the social interpretation of the (joint) go-nogo Simon effect (aka the social
Simon effect) and is able to integrate seemingly opposite findings on joint action.
Keywords: joint action, joint Simon effect, social cognition, stimulus-response compatibility, referential coding,
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout life, people are constantly engaging in social interactions, be it while playing games,
dancing, or working toward a common goal together. While doing so, they seem to share an implicit
understanding of what joint actionmeans, implies, and requires. The term is typically defined as the
ability to coordinate one’s own actions with those of others “in space and time to bring about a
change in the environment” (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006; p. 100).
Despite people’s intuitive understanding of joint action, its underlying cognitive mecha-
nism(s) are far from being fully understood, however. Scientific research over the last decades
improved our understanding of how perception and action are linked (i.e., by sharing com-
mon representations; Hommel et al., 2001), how individuals select task-relevant information,
predict upcoming actions, and integrate predicted effects of one’s own and others’ actions
(Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). However, this research studied single individuals performing var-
ious cognitive and/or behavioral tasks in isolation. Since social beings spend most of their time
interacting and communicating with others, a major function of human cognition is likely to
facilitate joint action (Frith and Wolpert, 2004; Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2009; Hasson
et al., 2012). What is unclear, however, is whether processing information about other peo-
ple and their activities requires special, dedicatedly “social” mechanisms, as some authors have
claimed (Sebanz et al., 2006a; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009), or whether universal information-
processing mechanisms are sufficient (Hommel et al., 2009; Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a). For
instance, while proponents of dedicated social mechanisms tend to take it as self-evident that
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synchronizing the behavior of multiple individuals requires the cognitive representation of the oth-
ers’ goals and actions, there are numerous examples of well-synchronized group behavior, such as
“schooling” in fish swarms (Shaw, 1978), that are very unlikely to rely on such high level repre-
sentations. Thus, one of the key questions of today’s cognitive science is: how and to what extent
do individuals mentally represent their own and others’ actions, and how do these representations
influence, shape, and constrain an individual’s own behavior when interacting with others?
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First experimental approaches targeting these issues compared performance on cognitive tasks
that were either carried out alone (single setting) or together with another person (joint setting).
Quite similar to tennis, say, individuals were thus responsible for the entire performance in the single
setting but were taking turns in the joint setting, where they shared labor and responsibility with
another person. The most prominent cognitive task that has been tested in single and joint settings
is the Simon task (Simon, 1969). Interestingly, performing this Stimulus-Response Compatibility
(SRC) task alone (standard Simon task) or when taking turns with another person (joint/social go-
nogo Simon task) often leads to comparable performance, i.e., a Simon effect (Sebanz et al., 2003),
which inspired the idea of human cognition to be mandatorily social (e.g., Tsai and Brass, 2007;
Welsh, 2009; Müller et al., 2011a). However, not only has it remained unclear what that actually
means but there is also still a considerable lack of understanding of the precise processes governing
joint task performance, apart from the fact that more recent findings fail to provide support for a
purely social picture of human cognition.
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC)
Reflects the amount of compatibility between given stimulus and corresponding response-features. High levels of
SRC are commonly associated with shorter RTs as compared to longer RTs due to low levels of SRC. Beside the
Simon effect, the Flanker, the Stroop, and the spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) are classical
SRC-paradigms.
In the following, we provide an overview of the basic method and the available findings in the
domain of joint action (with a strong focus on the social Simon effect). We will then make an
attempt to integrate the available evidence into a comprehensive theory–the Referential Coding
Account. As we will point out, this theoretical account provides an alternative to the social interpre-
tation of the (joint) go-nogo Simon effect and explains seemingly contradictory observations from
go-nogo Simon task performance.
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Referential Coding
Is required to discriminate concurrently activated event-representations (e.g., because of endogenous preparation,
stimulus-induced activation, and/or cross talk) that refer to conflicting (self- and/or other-generated) action alternatives.
Although location is critical in Simon-tasks, other event-features are also likely to enable event discrimination in a given
task context.
THE JOINT SIMON PARADIGM
A tremendous amount of studies provide behavioral as well as neurophysiological evidence for
the functional implications of shared representations between action and perception—within and
between individuals (e.g., Adolphs, 2003; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Amodio and Frith, 2006). For
instance, perceiving or imagining another person’s actions activates one’s own cognitive represen-
tations involved in planning and executing similar actions, which has been taken to provide a basic
mechanism that enables individuals to identify ongoing actions and to anticipate upcoming action
events. However, evidence for the functional equivalence between imagining, perceiving and execut-
ing an action (common coding; see Prinz, 1990, 1992, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001, for an extension
known as the Theory of Event Coding [TEC]) has been obtained under conditions where partici-
pants either passively observed other individuals performing certain actions or where they had to
imitate these actions (Brass and Heyes, 2005; Liepelt et al., 2008a, 2010). In contrast, when engaging
in joint action, individuals are often required to perform complementary parts of a given task,
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Shared representations
As cognitive representations are intrinsically individual and private they can only arise and operate in individual minds.
Consequentially, shared representations are cognitive representations of two or more individuals that refer to the
same reference object/event, thereby being both: private - existing in individual minds - and shared - referring to the
same reference.
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i.e., taking turns rather than acting at the same time. How one’s
own action planning and execution is influenced by the presence
of others, their task and their planned and executed actions dur-
ing social interaction is just beginning to be understood. Themost
prominent paradigm that has been developed to address this issue
is known as the joint Simon paradigm. In this paradigm two par-
ticipants share a task that in the standard version of the Simon
task is performed individually.
THE STANDARD SIMON TASK
In the standard Simon task, participants are required to carry out
spatially defined responses (e.g., left/right key presses) to non-
spatial stimulus attributes (e.g., auditory pitch or visual color;
Simon, 1969; Simon and Craft, 1970) that randomly appear on
the left or right of the participant. For example, participants
are instructed to press a right key whenever they perceive a
high-pitched tone and a left key in response to a low-pitched
tone. Even though stimulus location (left or right) is entirely
task-irrelevant, responses are typically faster when they spa-
tially correspond to the stimulus signaling them. That is, spatial
Stimulus-Response (S-R) correspondence facilitates task perfor-
mance, whereas non-corresponding S-R pairs commonly lead
to impaired performance—a phenomenon that is known as the
Simon effect (SE; Simon, 1990).
The SE has been replicated featuring diverse stimulus displays
(e.g., auditory, somatosensory, and visual; see Proctor and Vu,
2006; Hommel, 2011 for reviews) and a variety of S-R arrange-
ments (e.g., horizontal and vertical). Most models explain the SE
by assuming that a match between spatial stimulus locations and
spatial response locations (or features thereof) facilitates response
selection, be it (1) because of a direct association between
them (e.g., Kornblum et al., 1990; De Jong et al., 1994) or (2)
because the identity of the codes representing these locations (e.g.,
Hommel, 1993; Hommel et al., 2001), or (3) because attentional
shifts appearing in response to the lateralized stimulus presenta-
tion prime spatially corresponding action events (e.g., Nicoletti
and Umiltà, 1989, 1994). A mismatch between stimulus and
response locations in contrast is assumed to create competition
between the primed response and the response required by the
instruction (dual-route model; Kornblum et al., 1990).
According to this logic, the SE should not be obtained if
there is no alternative response (location). Indeed, if the task
is turned into a go-nogo task by having participants perform
with only one response key, thus eliminating the spatial dimen-
sion of the responses (individual or solo go-nogo Simon task), the
SE usually disappears (Hommel, 1996). And that makes sense:
In the absence of a feature overlap between spatially varying
stimuli and responses, S-R relations need no longer to be dis-
criminated and are therefore no longer spatially coded (Liepelt
et al., 2011; Hommel, 2013), eliminating the interference caused
by competing response tendencies and thus, the SE.
THE JOINT SIMON TASK
Interestingly, however, distributing the complementary go-nogo
parts of the standard Simon task across two participants, so that
each individual is responsible for operating one of the two buttons
in response to their assigned stimulus (i.e., joint/social go-nogo
Simon task), also lead to an SE (Sebanz et al., 2003)—a phe-
nomenon known as the joint Simon Effect (JSE). That is, similar
to the standard SE, observed when one participant is responsible
for both responses, participants in the joint go-nogo Simon task
respond faster if the assigned stimulus spatially corresponded to
the actor’s response key.
The finding of a JSE has been considered to demonstrate that
participants share a complementary, pre-instructed task set and
create not only a cognitive representation of their own action but
also co-represent (at least) the action of their co-actor (Sebanz
et al., 2003). By representing one’s own and another person’s
actions, the spatial dimension of the responses is thought to be
represented as well, thereby reintroducing a feature-overlap of
spatial S-R dimensions (Sebanz et al., 2003). Like in the stan-
dard SE, a match between spatial stimulus locations and spatial
response locations facilitates task performance, whereas a mis-
match induces response interference (Sebanz et al., 2003; Ferraro
et al., 2011). The JSE is thus attributed to action co-representation,
which is assumed to be an automatic and dedicated “social” pro-
cess (Knoblich and Sebanz, 2006; Sebanz et al., 2006a; Sebanz and
Knoblich, 2009).
The finding of the JSE and the far-reaching conclusions it has
been taken to suggest have ignited further behavioral, neuro-
scientific, and clinical research investigating the representations
underlying the JSE. The following sections will provide a brief
overview of these studies.
Behavioral findings
One of the questions that were tackled by behavioral studies was
whether the S-R compatibility effects in the joint action condi-
tion depend on the spatial relation between (left and right) stimuli
and response keys (response-based compatibility) or on the spatial
relation between (left and right) stimuli and responding agents
(agent-based compatibility). In contrast to the standard Simon
task, in which a single participant is responding with the left and
right hand, the joint Simon task requires participants to sit next to
each other and to respond with just one hand—usually the right
or dominant one. Hence, in the joint Simon task, the spatial ori-
gin of the agents’ bodies and the spatial origin of the response
keys provide two external frames of reference, an agent-based
and a response-based frame, respectively. If participants perform
the task with uncrossed (right) hands, the two reference frames
are fully aligned and therefore confounded. However, when both
actors’ hands are crossed, with the left sitting person operating the
right response key and vice versa, agent-based and response-based
coordinates are misaligned and can thus be deconfounded.
Using this rationale, Welsh (2009) found a visual JSE for
uncrossed and crossed hand postures irrespective of whether
the participants performed the task with the inner (i.e., right
hand of the left actor and left hand of the right co-actor) or
the outer hands (i.e., left hand of the left actor and right hand
of the right co-actor). This result suggests that the JSE is nei-
ther dependent on the spatial origin of the responding agents
(i.e., external, agent-based coordinates), nor on the anatomical
origin of the responding hands (i.e., internal, anatomical coor-
dinates), but rather tied to the spatial location of the response
keys (i.e., external, response-based coordinates; Welsh, 2009; but
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see Dolk et al., 2013b; Liepelt et al., 2013, for evidence suggest-
ing some flexibility in coding). Further support highlighting the
significance of spatial features in representing alternative action
events in joint Simon tasks comes from the so-called transfer-of-
learning paradigm, in which participants perform a number of
spatially incompatible responses to left and right stimuli before
performing the Simon task (i.e., agents on the right respond to
stimuli on the left, whereas the agents on the left respond to stim-
uli on the right; Milanese et al., 2010, 2011; Ferraro et al., 2012).
Practicing spatially incompatible responses have been found to
reverse the JSE, irrespective of whether co-actors remain the same
or change between practice and joint Simon task (Milanese et al.,
2011). However, when co-acting individuals changed their seats
in between spatially incompatible practice and subsequent joint
Simon task, a normal JSE was observed (Milanese et al., 2011;
Ferraro et al., 2012), suggesting that participants do not really
represent the social identity of co-actor or action but rather the
spatial relationship between action alternatives. Since the JSE-
polarity flips as a consequence of changing the spatial relations
between agents, responses, and stimuli but not when changing
the social identity of co-acting agents, one might argue that the
underlying cognitive representation is more reliably fed by and
thus, more sensitive to its constituting spatial features than to its
social features.
Despite the significance of spatial properties, other studies
investigated the impact of more conceptual factors. For example,
in a study of Tsai et al. (2008), participants thought they were
performing a joint Simon task together with an unseen person
(biological agent condition) or a computer (non-biological agent
condition), while they were actually interacting with a computer
program in both conditions. A JSE only occurred in the biologi-
cal agent condition, indicating that the belief of interacting with
an intentional agent can influence the representation of alterna-
tive action events (but see Welsh et al., 2007, for evidence against
this view). Recently, Sellaro et al. (2013) showed that the belief to
interact with an intentional agent alone is not sufficient to induce
the JSE, but that this belief has to be attached to a salient spatial
event that occurs next to the participant. Interestingly, once such
an alternative salient spatial event is established, ongoing sensory
feedback is not needed to keep up the cognitive representation
thereof and thus for establishing a JSE (Sebanz et al., 2003; Vlainic
et al., 2010).
Further studies investigated the influence of interpersonal
relationships on the JSE. Human interactions are, by default, per-
ceived to imply positive interdependence, which motivates people
to engage in acts of cooperation (Poortvliet and Darnon, 2010).
However, there are situations in daily life, such as competitive
contexts, where considering other agents too much may be of
disadvantage. Results from the JSE indeed seem to support this
assumption. While positive mood or a positive relationship with
the co-actor elicited a JSE, bad mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010),
intimidating co-actors (Hommel et al., 2009), or actual compe-
tition (i.e., instructions to out-perform others; Iani et al., 2011)
abolished or drastically decreased the JSE (but see Ruys and
Aarts, 2010, for a more complex picture). These findings show
that social factors do have some impact on how people represent
their own action vis-à-vis those of others. This conclusion is also
supported by the observation that the JSE is increased inmembers
of a collectivistic religion (Colzato et al., 2012a) and in individu-
als that were primed to attend to the social interdependence of
their self (Colzato et al., 2012b) or a divergent style of thinking
(Colzato et al., 2013).
Another social factor that affects the JSE is the perceived or
real similarity between agent and co-agent. For instance, Müller
et al. (2011a) observed that the JSE is more pronounced if
co-acting with another (videotaped) human than with a (video-
taped) Pinocchio, suggesting that the JSE increases with greater
similarity between co-actors. Interestingly, however, the decrease
of the effect with dissimilar co-actors can be reduced or elim-
inated by pre-instructing participants to take the perspective
of the non-biological co-actor (e.g., Pinocchio; Müller et al.,
2011a) or dissimilar human co-actor (e.g., out-group members;
Müller et al., 2011b). Similar findings were also observed for
human-robot interaction. When two groups of participants were
interacting with the same humanoid robot (controlled by a com-
puter program), the mere pre-instruction of interacting with an
“intentional” vs. unintentional robot moderated the degree of
action-event-representations, leading to a JSE in the intentional
but not in the unintentional condition (Stenzel et al., 2012). These
findings show that the JSE is sensitive to perceived interpersonal
similarity, which can be increased by priming anthropomorphic
interpretations (cf., Epley et al., 2007) of actually dissimilar
agents.
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Anthropomorphism
Is the technical term of ascribing human or human-like characteristics, emo-
tion, forms, intentions, motives and many more to animals, events, forces
of nature and other things or objects.
Electrophysiological and neuroimaging findings
Given that the standard Simon effect is commonly assumed
to reflect increased response conflict in S-R-incompatible trials
(Kornblum et al., 1990), electrophysiological and neuroimaging
techniques have been employed to study response-selection pro-
cesses and response conflict also in joint Simon tasks. Analyses
of event-related potentials (ERPs) showed a larger NoGo-P3, a
potential that is associated with action control and response inhi-
bition (e.g., Falkenstein et al., 1995; Bokura et al., 2001), for
incompatible nogo trials in joint conditions as compared to solo
go-nogo or passive co-actor conditions (Sebanz et al., 2006a;
Tsai et al., 2006). This finding has been taken to indicate that
more inhibitory control was needed on nogo trials in the joint
condition, because representations of pre-instructed alternative
action events had to be suppressed to fulfill the joint task require-
ments (Sebanz et al., 2006a; Tsai et al., 2006; Cavallo et al.,
2014). Additionally, Tsai et al. (2006) analyzed the Lateralized
Readiness Potential (LRP, time-locked to the stimulus onset), an
ERP-component assumed to reflect the stimulus-driven prepara-
tion of a manual response (i.e., response selection; Coles, 1989).
LRPs on compatible nogo trials and incompatible go trials were
also significantly larger in the joint as compared to the solo go-
nogo condition, which was taken to indicate priming effects of
cortical responses, corresponding to the co-actor’s actions (Tsai
et al., 2006). Similar results were obtained when Tsai et al. (2008)
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manipulated the intentionality of the co-actor (see Behavioral
Findings).
An fMRI study found stronger activations in medial frontal
cortex (MFC) and premotor cortex when participants performed
the Simon task together with an active as compared to a passive
co-actor, who just rested his/her finger on the alternative response
button (Sebanz et al., 2007). This result is in good accordance
with other neuroimaging findings highlighting the involvement
of MFC, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal sul-
cus (STS), and the temporal poles in social cognition (Adolphs,
2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Frith and Frith, 2007). While TPJ,
STS, and the temporal poles are typically associated with reason-
ing about mental states of self and other (e.g., Liepelt et al., 2008b;
Spengler et al., 2009; Van Overwalle, 2009), the MFC has been
suggested to be involved in monitoring and coding one’s own and
others’ actions (e.g., Frith and Frith, 2007; Radke et al., 2011; Dolk
et al., 2012).
Patient studies
Although the JSE has been shown to be modulated by the per-
ceived intentionality (Tsai and Brass, 2007; Müller et al., 2011a;
Stenzel et al., 2012) or perceived agency (Stenzel et al., 2014)
of co-acting agents, these findings do not directly indicate an
involvement of social reasoning and high-level social cogni-
tive processes. To investigate whether the effect involves, or is
related to the attribution of mental states to others (the so-
called Theory-of-Mind, ToM; see Premack and Woodruff, 1978),
Sebanz et al. (2005b) conducted a study with high-functioning
autistic patients. However, although individuals with autism are
generally assumed to have deficits in processing social informa-
tion (Frith, 2001; Frith and Frith, 2010), there was no evidence
that autistic individuals performed the joint Simon task any
differently than non-autistic controls.
It is important to emphasize that Sebanz et al. (2005b) studied
autistic individuals that either passed first or second-order ToM-
tasks, so that they were able to infer another person’s mental state
in principle (first order) and to infer one person’s beliefs about
another person’s beliefs (second order; Sebanz et al., 2005b).
These abilities are considered to reflect residual social processing
capacities (Humphreys and Bedford, 2011) that can potentially
account for the observed, basically normal JSE. To test for this
possibility, Humphreys and Bedford (2011) compared patients
with severe lesions in the frontal lobe with patients having lesions
in posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and TPJ. The latter failed both
first- and second-order ToM-tasks. Explicitly instructing both
patient groups to take the other persons’ action into account
revealed consistent JSEs in patients with temporoparietal lesions,
whereas the JSE decreased over time in patients with frontal
lesions. Humphreys and Bedford argued that patients with frontal
lesions may have difficulties in preserving sufficient processing
resources to maintain the other persons’ actions on top of coding
one’s own action events.
In conclusion, since both lesion groups of Humphreys and
Bedford failed in ToM-tasks, the available evidence does not
provide clear support for the idea that the JSE relies on a par-
ticular social mechanism, interpersonal perception or cognition,
or high-level social representation (e.g., mental state attribution).
HOW SOCIAL IS THE JOINT SIMON EFFECT?
The fact that the presence of another active individual is able
to increase response conflict, as evidenced by the emergence of
the JSE, indicates that agents must consider this presence in
one way or the other. The theoretical challenge is to determine
what the critical factor is and how it affects the representation
of tasks and actions. Several authors have suggested that the
agent may automatically co-represent the co-actors task-share,
i.e., the “rule that states the stimulus conditions under which a
co-actor should perform a certain action” (Sebanz et al., 2005a;
p. 1235). According to this action co-representation account, co-
representation increases the amount of conflict during action
selection, which in turn produces the JSE (cf., Sebanz et al., 2003,
2005a, 2006b, 2007; Tsai and Brass, 2007; Vesper et al., 2010;
Müller et al., 2011a,b).
Others have argued that the JSE may not reflect the co-
representation of the co-actor’s S-R rule but, rather, the co-
representation of the co-actor him/herself (Wenke et al., 2011).
This actor co-representation account shifts the focus from the co-
actors’ mere S-R-based activity to their responsibility to act, and it
suggests that the action selection conflict does not reflect difficul-
ties with action-event-discrimination (i.e., with respect to which
particular action is to be performed) but with self-other discrim-
ination (i.e., with respect to which particular agent is responsible
for an action to be performed in a certain moment in time). In
other words, the JSE might reflect uncertainty as to whose turn
it is to execute the upcoming action (for a similar line of argu-
ments see, the agent identification account; Philipp and Prinz,
2010).
Unfortunately, both of these social approaches fail to explain a
number of observations. For one, both would suggest that indi-
vidual difficulties to represent other people and their actions
should reduce or eliminate the JSE, which is inconsistent with
the available findings in patients suffering from such difficul-
ties (see Patient Studies). For another, both approaches suggest
that the co-actor must actually be an intentional agent or at least
be interpreted in anthropomorphic ways. That this is unneces-
sary was demonstrated by a recent study of Dolk et al. (2011).
In several experiments, these authors systematically de-socialized
the “joint” Simon task context. First, they showed that a signifi-
cant “JSE” can be obtained if the actor performs a solo go-nogo
Simon task side-by-side a passive observer of the alternative
response button that is associated with an attention-attracting
event. Next, they demonstrated that the same effect is obtained
when the passive observer is absent, suggesting that it was only
the attention-attracting event that created the response conflict.
The Dolk et al. (2011) study suggests that neither the integra-
tion of another person nor the integration of another person’s
action into one’s own action, task, or body representation is
necessary for the JSE to occur. As even non-social events are
sufficient to reliably influence an individual’s own task perfor-
mance, it seems to be the presence or expectation of salient events
as such that underlies the JSE. Hence, the JSE may be socially
induced by the presence of a responding co-actor without neces-
sarily being social in nature. Indeed, Dolk et al. (2013a) observed
significant JSEs induced by a Japanese waving cat and a ticking
metronome.
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As an alternative to the more “social” accounts, Guagnano
et al. (2010) suggested that the co-actor’s action may serve no
other purpose than providing a spatial reference frame. According
to this spatial response coding account, an actor’s own action is
coded in relation to the other’s action—just like in the standard
Simon task, where one’s own left-hand action provides a spatial
reference for the relative coding of one’s right-hand action, and
vice versa (Hommel, 1996). Based on their results (which showed
a JSE with close but not with distant co-actors), Guagnano et al.
(2010) further proposed that such a reference frame is effective
only if the co-actor is responding in the participant’s peripersonal
space (i.e., within arm reach), but not if he or she is responding
in the participant’s extrapersonal space (i.e., outside of reaching
distance; but, see Welsh et al., 2013 for a more complex pic-
ture). Note that neither the action or actor co-representation
account nor the agent identification account can explain this dis-
tance effect, which provides some indirect support for the spatial
response coding account. Likewise, the spatial response coding
account does not require any social attribution processes, so that
it can easily deal with the demonstration of reliable JSEs in patient
populations in which processes are impaired (see Patient Studies).
At the same time, however, the account fails to explain why JSEs
should depend on the agent’s mood (Kuhbandner et al., 2010),
religious attitude (Colzato et al., 2012a), self-construal (Colzato
et al., 2012b), style of thinking (Colzato et al., 2013) or on the
personal relationship between actor and co-actor (Hommel et al.,
2009).
A REFERENTIAL CODING ACCOUNT
Given the difficulties that social accounts of the JSE have with
the effectivity of non-social factors and the opposite problems of
the spatial response coding account with explaining the impact of
some social factors, Dolk et al. (2013a) suggested a more com-
prehensive referential coding account. In the following, we will
introduce the basic assumptions of the referential coding account
and illustrate how this account may be able to integrate the
available evidence on the JSE.
Performing a (joint or solo) Simon task requires the prepara-
tion and selection of intentional actions. According to ideomotor
theories of action control (Prinz, 1987; Hommel et al., 2001;
Hommel, 2010), actions are represented by codes of their sen-
sory consequences. In particular, TEC (Hommel et al., 2001)
assumes that cognitive action representations consist of networks
of codes representing the features of all perceivable effects, such
as the seen, heard or felt location, direction and speed of an
action, the effector it involves, the object it may relate to, and so
forth (Hommel, 1997). Action control operates on these percep-
tual representations and action selection consists in activating the
codes of the to-be-generated action effects (i.e., of the perceptual
consequences of the action).
Importantly for our purposes, this rationale of representation
implies that one’s own actions and the actions of another person
are basically represented in the same way (i.e., by means of the
same kinds of codes; Hommel, 2009, 2011; see Figure 1). If we
assume that response conflict reflects the concurrent activation of
more than one action representation (e.g., because of endogenous
preparation, stimulus-induced activation, and/or cross talk), this
means that actively representing another person’s action can cre-
ate the same kind of response conflict than actively representing
more than one of one’s own possible actions. In other words, what
matters for response conflict is the number of concurrently active
action representations but not the source of the activation.
FIGURE 1 | Referential coding in the go-nogo versions of the Simon task.
The figure shows tasks in which the agent operates the left response key. In
the Solo version, a left keypress produces numerous action effects (i.e.,
something manual and fast, with an index finger moving, something human
on the left that comes with a clicking sound, etc.) and can thus be coded in
many ways; i.e., be represented by any of these and other action effects. In
the Joint condition, the same action effects are produced and could be used
for referential coding, but most of them are shared by the other, alternative
event. With one exception: the location. Discriminating between the two
action events thus requires emphasizing (attending to, weighting more
strongly) the corresponding (response) location. This makes the left keypress
to be represented mainly as “left.” Any event sharing that feature (such as a
target stimulus on the left side) will thus activate the corresponding action
more strongly in the Joint than in the Solo task-the Joint Simon effect.
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What the actor eventually needs to do is to select the task-
relevant action representation from all concurrently activated
representations. Concurrent activation thus creates a discrimi-
nation problem, which requires a strong focus on those features
that discriminate best between task-relevant and task-irrelevant
representations (see Ansorge and Wühr, 2004 for a response dis-
crimination account of the standard Simon effect). In the classical
Simon task, the most obvious discriminating feature is horizon-
tal location. As a consequence, people are likely to code their
responses as “left” and “right,” which equips the active action rep-
resentations with spatial codes that can interact with equivalent
spatial stimulus codes—which in turn creates a SE (Hommel
et al., 2001). Rendering the task into a go-nogo task by hav-
ing participants to respond to only one of the two stimuli by
performing just one of the two responses eliminates the response-
discrimination problem, as now there is just one response being
observed and to be executed. Accordingly, there is no need to code
responses as “left” or “right” anymore, which explains why the SE
typically disappears (Hommel, 1996).
However, as soon as an alternative action is made available,
as in the social or non-social go-nogo-Simon task, the discrim-
ination problem is back. Given the typically arranged (joint)
workspace (i.e., horizontally or vertically; e.g., Dittrich et al.,
2013), it appears reasonable that participants will again empha-
size the discriminating features of their responses (i.e., through
an increased “intentional weighting” of spatial features; Hommel
et al., 2001; Yamaguchi and Proctor, 2012; Memelink and
Hommel, 2013; see Figure 1) and thereby code their responses as
“left” or “right.” Thus, quite similar to the standard Simon task, an
alternative response provides the most obvious reference frame,
an assumption we share with the response coding account (e.g.,
Guagnano et al., 2010). As one would expect from this consider-
ation, no JSE is obtained if participants always react together, so
that the two responses need not be discriminated (Lam and Chua,
2009), or if the left-right arrangement of the responses does not
match the (vertical) arrangement of the stimuli (Dittrich et al.,
2012, 2013).
As TEC does not distinguish between merely perceived events
and self-generated events (i.e., perceptions and actions), or
between social and non-social events (i.e., living beings and
objects), the referential coding account can easily accommo-
date the observation that non-social events can induce a JSE
(Dolk et al., 2011, 2013a). In fact, any representation can create
conflict with a representation of the currently (most) relevant
response if it is sufficiently active. This implies that the repre-
sented event would need to be attended and/or sufficiently salient,
which obviously applies to a Japanese waving cat and a ticking
metronome, and thus accounts for the observation that non-
social events can induce JSEs much like the presence of another
human does (Dolk et al., 2013a), but less so to a distant co-actor
(Guagnano et al., 2010). Since the referential coding account does
not only account for the ability of these and other non-social
events to elicit a JSE (see also Tsai et al., 2011; Dittrich et al., 2012),
it also explains why the effect decreases with decreasing similarity
between perceived and to-be-executed action events (Dolk et al.,
2011, 2013a): the more similar two given (action) event repre-
sentations (anticipated or perceived effects) are the stronger is
the cross talk between them. In other words, representations of
similar action events are more difficult to discriminate, which
makes it more likely that the most obvious and parsimonious
event-feature: spatial location is used to help with the discrimina-
tion. This rationale also accounts for the more pronounced JSEs
in human-human interactions compared to interactions with a
computer (Tsai et al., 2008), a machine-like robot (Stenzel et al.,
2012), or a puppet (Tsai and Brass, 2007): action events produced
by non-human, inanimate entities simply exhibit a lesser degree
of (perceptual and/or conceptual) similarity with human actions
(see Figure 1). It also explains why robot- or puppet-induced JSEs
increase in size if these “co-actors” are made to behave intention-
ally (Stenzel et al., 2012) or otherwise more human-like (Müller
et al., 2011a).
As we have discussed above, a number of social factors
have been shown to affect the JSE. How does referential cod-
ing account for these observations? According to TEC’s cogni-
tive binding principle (Hommel, 2004), cognitive representations
integrate concurrently active feature codes. It is this principle
that accounts for the integration of motor patterns with codes of
their perceptual consequences—the key assumption of ideomo-
tor theory (Hommel, 2009). While codes related to immediate
action consequences are likely to be activated by performance
of the given action, these codes will not be the only ones being
active at that time. People can clearly distinguish between their
own actions and those carried out by others (even if not all
representational systems reflect that difference), which means
that codes representing themselves (their body, affective state,
goals, etc.) are integrated to some degree with action repre-
sentations, which provides additional means to discriminate
between self-generated and other-generated actions. Again, the
self-related codes can overlap with other-related codes to various
degrees, depending on the perceived similarity between me and
other (see Figure 1). According to the rationale explained above,
more similarity would make the discrimination more difficult,
which in turn would require more emphasis on the discrim-
inating spatial features. As this emphasis should increase the
JSE, this would imply that greater perceived similarity between
actor and co-actor should increase the JSE. Note that while
the application of this reasoning to the JSE refers to the cod-
ing of location (the only obvious candidate in the standard JSE
task), any other feature can serve this function, too, as long as
it enables sufficient discrimination between (stimulus- and/or
action) event-alternatives, and thus provides a reference for cod-
ing one’s own actions (see, Sellaro et al., under review, for a
feature other than location, i.e., color).
As we have discussed already, various observations have con-
firmed this prediction. Given that interpersonal relationships
(e.g., Mikulincer et al., 1998) and group membership (e.g., Aron
et al., 1991; Avenanti et al., 2010) have been shown to increase
perceived self-other overlap (Davis et al., 1996) and induce amore
positive evaluation of the other (Brewer, 1979), it is reasonable to
assume that a positive relationship between co-acting individuals
or positive mood leads to greater perceived similarity (Heider,
1958). This explains the larger JSEs found under such conditions
(Hommel et al., 2009; Kuhbandner et al., 2010), and it accounts
for both the disappearance of the JSE when interacting with an
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out-group member (Müller et al., 2011b) and the reappearance
of the effect after instructing participants to take the out-group
member’s perspective (Müller et al., 2011b).
Taken together, the principle of the referential coding account
can be generalized to the following assumption: Self- and other-
generated events are cognitively represented by means of codes
describing their perceptual features and the perceivable effects
they create (e.g., attitude, color, direction, emotions, location,
orientation, shape, speed and any other personal and non-
personal characteristics; Dolk et al., 2011; Colzato et al., 2012a,b;
Hommel, 2013). The degree of similarity would then not nec-
essarily be a qualitative, but rather a gradual one (Hommel,
2013). Accordingly, increasing the degree of similarity increases
the demand of discriminating alternative event-representations,
leading to larger JSEs. This is an interestingmethodological impli-
cation: The size of the JSE might be taken as an indicator of the
similarity between (self- and other-generated) alternative events,
and as a measure of the degree of self-other integration, particu-
larly in social contexts—which in turn might make the go-nogo
Simon paradigm a valuable educational or rehabilitative tool
(Humphreys and Bedford, 2011; Liepelt et al., 2012).
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Event-representations
According to the Theory of Event Coding (TEC) events (self- and/or other-
generated) are cognitively represented by means of codes describing their
perceptual features and the perceivable effects they create (e.g., attitude,
belief, color, desire, emotion, orientation, shape, sound, speed, and any
other characteristics).
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